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Using national movement databases to help inform responses to swine disease outbreaks in Scotland: the impact of uncertainty around incursion time

Porphyre, T; Boden, LA; Correia-Gomes, C; Auty, HK; Gunn, GJ; Woolhouse, MEJ

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1 Using national movement databases to help inform responses to swine
2 disease outbreaks in Scotland: the impact of uncertainty around incursion
3 time

4 Thibaud Porphyre^{1*}, t.porphyre@ed.ac.uk

5 Lisa A. Boden², Lisa.Boden@glasgow.ac.uk

6 Carla Correia-Gomes³, Carla.Gomes@sruc.ac.uk

7 Harriet K. Auty³, Harriet.Auty@sruc.ac.uk

8 George J. Gunn³, George.Gunn@sruc.ac.uk

9 Mark E.J. Woolhouse¹, Mark.Woolhouse@ed.ac.uk

10

11 ¹ Centre for Immunity, Infection and Evolution, University of Edinburgh, King's Buildings, Edinburgh, UK.

12 ² School of Veterinary Medicine, Boyd Orr Centre for Population and Ecosystem Health, College of
13 Medical, Veterinary and Life Sciences, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK.

14 ³ Epidemiology Research Unit, SRUC, Drummondhill, Stratherrick Road, Inverness, UK

15

16 *Corresponding author: Thibaud Porphyre, University of Edinburgh, King's Buildings, Ashworth
17 Laboratories, Charlotte Auerbach Road, Edinburgh EH9 3FL, Scotland, UK. Tel: +44 (0)131 650 7263.
18 Email: t.porphyre@ed.ac.uk

19

20 **Abstract**

21 Modelling is an important component of contingency planning and control of disease outbreaks. Dynamic
22 network models are considered more useful than static models because they capture important dynamic
23 patterns of farm behaviour as evidenced through animal movements. This study evaluates the usefulness of
24 a dynamic network model of swine fever to predict pre-detection spread via movements of pigs, when there
25 may be considerable uncertainty surrounding the time of incursion of infection. It explores the utility and
26 limitations of animal movement data to inform such models and as such, provides some insight into the
27 impact of improving traceability through real-time animal movement reporting and the use of electronic
28 animal movement databases. The study concludes that the type of premises and uncertainty of the time of
29 disease incursion will affect model accuracy and highlights the need for improvements in these areas.

30

31 **Introduction**

32 The epidemics of bovine spongiform encephalopathy in Europe¹ and of foot-and-mouth disease in the UK²
33 showed the importance of using mathematical models of disease transmission in providing key information
34 to design contingency planning for animal disease outbreaks. By providing epidemiological insight that can
35 be considered alongside the complex interactions between social, economic and welfare outcomes of
36 disease incursions and control strategies, models have helped to inform decisions on disease control²⁻⁵, and
37 can also be used judiciously as tools to improve communication with non-expert stakeholders⁶. Models must
38 be based on robust data and assumptions to usefully inform policies and add value to field-based control
39 activities. However, disease control decisions during epidemic responses are made in the context of wide
40 range of uncertainties. Improving our understanding of the impact of these uncertainties on infectious
41 disease models outcomes is therefore a way to improve their capabilities to efficiently inform policy.

42 Network models, which were once confined to physics and social science problems⁷, have proliferated in the
43 field of human⁸⁻¹⁰ and animal^{4,5,11,12} health and are increasingly used to inform disease control strategies as
44 part of national contingency plans. When applied to animal diseases, these models consider farms as nodes
45 of a network that are linked by the transfer or movement of (potentially infected) animals. Animal
46 movements are increasingly recorded in national databases, informing on the daily number of animals
47 moved between all farms present in an industry. This large volume of data enables models to appropriately
48 capture the dynamic changes in the contact structure between farms, and therefore enables them to directly
49 adjust for the underlying farm-level economic and behavioural variations when moving animals. As such,
50 predictions from dynamic networks models are potentially more accurate than those from models
51 considering the animal movement network as static^{13,14}.

52 As movement of animals within the livestock industry carries the risk of transmitting infectious diseases
53 across substantial geographical distances, dynamic network models have been increasingly used prior to
54 disease outbreaks to improve preparedness. Particularly, dynamic network models have been used to assess
55 the potential for pre-detection spread of infection via movements of animals^{5,11}, identify regional and local
56 movement patterns^{4,11}, and provide guidance for the design of efficient control and surveillance strategies^{4,12}.
57 However, their use may go further, notably by estimating the extent of the disease spread that has already

58 occurred when disease incursions have been detected and restrictions on animal movements are
59 implemented¹⁵. By quickly and accurately estimating the spatial extent of the pre-detection spread via
60 movements of animals, they potentially offer additional tools to support field-based contact tracing, and
61 increase the efficiency of disease control responses. However, little work has been done to exploit dynamic
62 network models to such effect.

63 The emphasis on using dynamic network models for contingency planning, but not during an outbreak, may
64 be due to an assumption that they are less useful for making predictions of disease spread or identifying high
65 risk farms in scenarios in which disease incursion has already occurred^{6,16}. This assumption may be based on
66 two prior beliefs: (i) that data quality may be compromised by time-lags in data recording; and (ii) that the
67 date of infection, which is critical to appropriate data selection, may be difficult to ascertain with any
68 certainty. Time-lags in data recording would mean that models have to rely on historical data. However, this
69 problem has been minimised by the advent of electronic databases which mean farmers may directly report
70 movements ahead of time. As a result, live animal movements, such as for sheep and pigs, are now available
71 in real-time in Scotland (through the Scottish livestock electronic identification and traceability database
72 ScotEID, <https://www.scoteid.com/>) to inform epidemiological modelling to predict the dissemination of a
73 pathogen throughout the livestock industry in a timeframe relevant to disease control activities.

74 Establishing an accurate date of infection is crucial for identifying which data should be included in the
75 model. This can be difficult, as it depends on factors such as clinical presentation and the success of field-
76 based contact tracing procedures, both of which can vary widely. The impact of this uncertainty around date
77 of infection may depend on the temporal dynamism in the pattern of animal movements between farms, and
78 differences in farm trading behaviour, in a given livestock industry. This may affect model predictions (and
79 the uncertainty around them) of the patterns of disease spread.

80 The objective of this study is to assess the usefulness of dynamic network models for predicting the spatial
81 extent of the pre-detection spread via movements of animals, when there may be considerable uncertainty
82 surrounding the time of incursion of infection. In order to achieve this objective, we have focused on
83 diseases of pigs (e.g. swine fevers such as classical swine fever (CSF) or African swine fever (ASF) viruses)

84 which have non-specific clinical signs as well as a high potential to be transmitted through animal
85 movements^{17,18}. These characteristics provide a useful model scenario because of the challenging nature of
86 disease detection and the increased potential for silent spread within the pig population. We then explored
87 the usefulness and limitations of using pig movement data (using ScotEID as an exemplar) to inform models
88 when attempting to respond to an infectious disease incursion. Thus the results of this study should also
89 provide insight into the impact of improving traceability through real-time animal movement reporting and
90 the use of electronic animal movement databases.

91 **Results**

92 **Impact of uncertainty in infection time**

93 We looked at the extent to which inaccuracy in defining the disease incursion date may impact on the
94 accuracy of predictions of pre-detection spread of acute swine diseases via movements of pigs. A premises-
95 based model was developed to simulate their spread through the Scottish swine industry via movements of
96 pigs, in which gathering places (such as markets, and collection centres) were explicitly modelled together
97 with pig producers. In the first instance, we considered the extreme case where infection occurs if at least 1
98 animal from an infected premises is received by a susceptible one. In this situation, the “infection paths” $\Gamma_{t,i}$
99 of farms that were infected via movements of animals from a single pig producer i was computed for each
100 Monday of the year 2012. Here, we considered all i^{th} producers that were active during the period $[t_0, t_0+T]$
101 eligible to be an index-case, where t_0 is the incursion date and T is the “pre-detection period” (that is, the
102 period between the date of the incursion t_0 and the date of the first detection of the disease). We then
103 compared the infection paths $\Gamma_{t,i}$ with those $\Gamma_{t+\delta,i}$ generated when time of infection t_0 is inaccurately estimated
104 by an error δ ranging from $-7\delta_0$ to $7\delta_0$. In this study, infection path $\Gamma_{t,i}$ refers to the “correct” full epidemic
105 tree that is generated by a single infection event at time t_0 and left freely spreading for the pre-detection
106 period $[t_0, t_0+T]$, while $\Gamma_{t+\delta,i}$ refers to the “predicted” full epidemic tree when the incursion date is
107 inaccurately estimated and for which the pre-detection period is $[t_0+\delta, t_0+T-\delta]$. We considered, $\delta_0=7$ days
108 and $T=60$ days¹⁹.

109 In Figure 1, we show how increasing uncertainty around the time of incursion may affect one’s ability to
110 accurately predict not only the number of premises involved in the full epidemic tree but also their identity.

111 Overall, progressively increasing the error δ around the time of the incursion from δ_0 to $7\delta_0$ yielded a marked
112 reduction in the correlation between sizes (i.e., the number of premises involved in) of infection paths $\Gamma_{t,i}$
113 and $\Gamma_{t+\delta,i}$ (Figures 1a-b). Although this reduction was consistent across paths of all sizes (Figures 1a), it was
114 more pronounced for paths of larger sizes (Figure 1b). Also, there was a clear divide between infection paths
115 generated from commercial producers and those generated from non-commercial producers (Figure 1c).
116 Despite a wide uncertainty on the time of the incursion, the correlation remained high between infection
117 paths generated by commercial producers (Spearman's correlation coefficient $\rho > 0.60$), whether assured or
118 non-assured, for errors ranging from $-7\delta_0$ to $4\delta_0$. In contrast, correlation between infection paths becomes
119 weaker for incursions in non-commercial producers, with $\rho < 0.60$ for errors of $\pm 3\delta_0$.

120 In order to see if we could accurately predict which individual premises would be involved in epidemics
121 despite some inaccuracy in the incursion time, we compared the concordance between infection paths $\Gamma_{t,i}$ and
122 $\Gamma_{t+\delta,i}$ generated from the same index-case i , by calculating the Jaccard similarity index $J(\Gamma_{t,i}, \Gamma_{t+\delta,i})$. The
123 Jaccard index measures the fraction of common premises within paths $|\check{\zeta}_{t,i} \cap \check{\zeta}_{t+\delta,i}|$ among the total number of
124 premises $|\check{\zeta}_{t,i} \cup \check{\zeta}_{t+\delta,i}|$ involved in both paths. Here, we only focused on infection paths involving more than
125 10 infected premises.

126 Progressively increasing the error around the infection time up to $7\delta_0$ revealed a reduction in the median
127 degree of overlap between paths (Figure 1d). The rate of this reduction differed, however, whether the
128 incursion time is believed earlier (i.e. $\delta < 0$) or later (i.e. $\delta > 0$) than the true one. Overall, an error of $-4\delta_0$ in the
129 infection time yielded 77% (95% CI 0.76 - 0.79) overlaps between the true and predicted paths, whereas an
130 error of $> 2\delta_0$ is enough to create completely different paths with paths involving, on average, less than half
131 of common premises.

132 Unsurprisingly, variations between producer types were observed in the degree of overlap between $\Gamma_{t,i}$ and
133 $\Gamma_{t+\delta,i}$. While the degree of overlap between predicted and the true paths generated by commercial producers
134 followed closely the general trend, it differs greatly when considering paths generated by non-commercial
135 small producers. This was expected, because most paths of > 10 infected premises have been generated by
136 commercial producers. However, differences between the degree of overlap for paths generated by

137 commercial and those by non-commercial producers depends on the direction of the error δ : when $\delta < 0$,
138 predicted paths generated by non-commercial producers have a greater number of common premises with
139 the true path, whereas paths would show a completely different pattern (i.e. $J(\Gamma_{t,i}, \Gamma_{t+\delta,i}) < 10\%$) from $> 4\delta_0$
140 (Figure 1d). These results suggest that if incursion occurs in non-commercial producers, conservative
141 estimates in incursion times would be preferential. However, this may not be true for incursion occurring in
142 commercial producers as a trade-off may exist between optimising the proportion of premises that are truly
143 on the infection path (true positives) and minimising the proportion of premises that are not (false positives).
144 Figure 2 explores how these two epidemiological measures vary with δ for paths generated by the different
145 producer types. Over-estimating incursion times for outbreaks generated from commercial producers
146 (whether assured or not), would increase the risk of misclassification. For example, inferences generated for
147 outbreaks from non-assured and from assured commercial producers when $\delta = -5\delta_0$ would involve 24% (95%
148 CI 22% - 29%) and 39% (95% CI 37% - 41%) of false positives, respectively (Figure 2b).

149 So far in this analysis, the potential for spread of infection via movements of animals has been evaluated
150 considering that any movement from infected premises during the pre-detection period would result in
151 disease transmission to susceptible farms. In reality, the prevalence of disease within infected premises will
152 determine what proportion β of its livestock becomes infectious. This, together with the number of animals
153 that are being moved off, will determine what proportion of movements will contain infectious animals. To
154 gain general insight and ensure robustness of the results to variation in β , 10,000 simulations for each
155 Monday of the year 2012 with a random index-case per simulation were carried (i.e., total of 570,000
156 simulations). For each incursion date t_0 , the infection paths $\Gamma'_{t,i}$ of farms that were infected via animal
157 movements from a single pig producer i was then computed and compared to the infection paths $\Gamma'_{t+\delta,i}$ that
158 were predicted when an error δ around the time of the incursion is made. As above, $\Gamma'_{t,i}$ and $\Gamma'_{t+\delta,i}$ are the
159 “correct” and “predicted” partial epidemic tree, respectively, and correspond to all farms that have a non-null
160 probability of being infected via animal movements from a single pig producer i . Figure 3 shows that,
161 whether comparison is made with the “correct” full epidemic tree $\Gamma_{t,i}$ (i.e. when $\beta=1$) or with the “correct”
162 partial epidemic tree $\Gamma'_{t,i}$ (i.e. when $\beta < 1$), qualitatively similar results as in Figure 1 are obtained. However, it
163 further appears that decreasing the value of β would reduce the effect of δ when predicting the size of the

164 infection path (Figure 3a). It is to note, however, that this result may give a false sense of security as the
165 degree of overlaps between correct and predicted paths still sharply decreases with increasing error δ around
166 the time of the incursion from δ_0 to $7\delta_0$ (Figure 3b).

167 **Intrinsic structure of infection paths**

168 Although our findings suggest that inferring the spread of an epidemic from dynamic network models is
169 precarious when the date of the disease incursion is unknown, infection paths may have some intrinsic
170 structure which may still guide contact tracing procedures. Previously, such a structure was found in the
171 Italian cattle industry by comparing epidemic trees and regrouping index-cases which generated similar
172 trees, thereby providing critical information to optimize surveillance systems and define rapid containment
173 strategies⁴. Applying a similar method for the Scottish swine industry, however, would only result in
174 regrouping producers that belong to the same business or are part of the same breeding pyramid. Instead, we
175 looked at the producer type of both the index case and all farms that have been infected via the movement of
176 animals when considering $\beta=1$, and determined, for all full epidemic tree $\Gamma_{t,i}$ that gave rise to at least 10
177 cases from the year 2012, the proportion of producers of each type that were involved in each infection path.
178 The results are summarized in Figure 4.

179 If disease incursion occurs in the herd of a small producer, the mean risk of disease spillover into assured
180 producers is low (0.011); and similar to the mean risk of disease spillover from assured producers to small
181 producers (0.032). Epidemics which start in a small producer spread into at least one assured producer in
182 only 1.9% of the incursions. However, once an assured producer is infected, 60% (Q1-Q3: 17% - 71%) of
183 the premises in the generated infection paths would belong to assured producers. In contrast, epidemics
184 generated from assured producers would spread into small producers in 39% of the incursions, but would not
185 involve many of them, with only 8% (Q1-Q3: 2% - 27%) of premises in these infection paths belonging to
186 small producers. These findings are the consequence of producers adhering to quality assurance scheme
187 guidelines on risks associated with animal trading²⁰, confirming that excluding interactions with producers
188 that have lower biosecurity standards is a good biosecurity practice²¹. Such a result may constitute a basis for
189 the development of qualitative rules modulating surveillance activities in the face of an epidemic.

190 Non-assured commercial producers appear to have a totally different epidemiological profile (Figure 4).
191 Non-assured commercial producers have a consistently high probability (> 95%) of being on an infection
192 path and make up, on average, 17% (Q1-Q3: 9% - 22%) of premises in these paths, regardless of the producer
193 type of the incursion. In addition, epidemics generated by non-assured producers show a high likelihood of
194 infecting both small producers (0.62) and assured producers (0.85). This result highlights that Scottish swine
195 producers who are commercially driven but do not belong to assurance schemes may potentially represent
196 “epidemiological” bridges between non-commercial and commercial partners, likely because they
197 implement lower biosecurity, particularly with regard to sourcing and sending pigs, compared to assured
198 commercial producers. Therefore, improving biosecurity and targeting surveillance to non-assured producers
199 may be particularly beneficial to optimise responses to disease incursions.

200 **Discussion**

201 In order to improve preparedness for disease incursion, it is critical to have some understanding of model
202 resiliency to uncertainties which fundamentally underlie the stochastic nature of disease control activities. In
203 this study, we evaluated the resilience of dynamic network models in predicting disease spread after disease
204 incursion, when there may be considerable uncertainty surrounding the timing of infection. A model which
205 predicts the spread of swine fevers was chosen as an exemplar because of the characteristics of the disease
206 and its parameterisation using pig movement data from an electronic database. This has particular relevance
207 and potential policy impact because ASF virus has recently spread within the eastern European region²² and
208 the middle east²³, and now poses an imminent threat to the European swine industry^{24,25}. Although there are
209 measures in place to reduce the risk of introduction of disease, such as restrictions on the movement of live
210 pigs and animal products in affected areas, and regulations on animal swill feeding (which has been banned
211 in the European Union since 2002), further incursions and spread of these diseases throughout Europe are
212 considered likely^{24,26,27}.

213 Our analysis not only confirmed that increasing the uncertainty around the incursion date significantly
214 reduced the ability of dynamic network models to predict epidemic characteristics, such as epidemic size, or
215 specific premises that become infected, but also quantified the magnitude of the loss of accuracy of
216 predictions. For example, erroneously estimating the time of incursion more than three weeks earlier appears

217 to generate a low accuracy of predicting cases (i.e. less than 60%, Figure 1d), which would miss between
218 30% to 50% of the potentially infected farms (Figure 2a). Although such a measurement bias may
219 potentially generate longer and more severe epidemics, it may be preferable to the alternative
220 misclassification error. A prediction that a farm is potentially infected, when it is not likely to be because of
221 the true absence of contact with an at-risk farm, may have unintended negative consequences for resource
222 allocation (of veterinarians which may be needed more urgently elsewhere) and farmer welfare and
223 behaviour (in response to the fear for potential loss of livestock and livelihood).

224 The type of premises where the incursion occurs can drastically impact on the scale of both of these biases
225 and, therefore, on the resilience of predictions to temporal uncertainties. In the Scottish swine industry, the
226 predictability of the number of premises infected via animal movement (Figure 1c) and of specific premises
227 that become infected (Figure 1d) differ whether epidemics are generated by commercial or non-commercial
228 producers. While our results indicate that all inferences produced from dynamic network models clearly
229 suffer when the time of infection is estimated earlier (Figures 1d and 2), more conservative estimates of time
230 of infection appear only preferable when incursion occurs in small producers. In this situation, widening the
231 time window considered for the incursion would ensure that the incursion is included while not losing
232 performance. Although this may be counterintuitive, it could be explained by the frequency of movements
233 occurring from small producers. It has been previously shown that the rate of movement from and to small
234 producers in Scotland is four to ten times lower than commercially-driven producers²⁰, with an average of a
235 movement every 29 weeks. It is therefore likely that increasing the time window for the incursion would
236 include most of the movements that may be infectious while avoiding the inclusion of a large number of
237 farms that are not infected. These results suggest that widening the time window considered for the incursion
238 would provide a cost-efficient strategy when responding to incursion of infectious diseases in small
239 producers, avoiding wasting resources that would be required to establish a precise incursion date.

240 In the model, we have first assumed that the trade of at least one animal between infected and susceptible
241 premises was sufficient to allow infection to occur. It is obvious that this assumption may overestimate the
242 extent of disease spread via movements of pigs (although bearing in mind that this model did not consider
243 the potential for spread by other routes), as the infection process between farms is stochastic and depends on

244 the within-farm prevalence as well as the virulence of the relevant outbreak strain. However, these
245 assumptions seem appropriate because they not only increase the ease of the comparison between epidemic
246 trees, but also enable (1) robust estimates of the potential geographical extent of disease spread that is
247 consistent with contact tracing procedures and (2) communication of the general implication of temporal
248 uncertainties in model inferences to policy makers (and model users in general). Nevertheless, varying the
249 probability of transmission did not change the qualitative outcome of our analysis (Figure 3).

250 It is clear from this study that on detection of an incursion, effort should be focused on obtaining an accurate
251 incursion date. Improved accuracy of this estimate will improve the validity of epidemiological outputs from
252 dynamic network models at early stages of an epidemic, and therefore will optimise the identification of the
253 sources of infection and any presumed susceptible in-contact animals. However, quick detection of disease
254 incursions is also critical. While the role of small producers in the spread of swine diseases has been
255 previously shown^{28,29}, routine surveillance activities (i.e. surveillance conducted not during an outbreak)
256 mostly target assured commercial producers (for example abattoir inspection, veterinary/health scheme
257 monitoring). Superficially, this risk-based surveillance strategy is reasonable because of the important
258 influence of commercial producers on the sustainability of pig products (and the pig industry) and thus, food
259 security³⁰. However, Figure 4 suggests that exclusively targeting assured commercial producers during
260 routine surveillance activities will likely miss incursion events in backyard producers. Simulation studies
261 looking at the spread of CSF in Bulgaria, where small producers are believed to play a role in the persistence
262 of the disease³¹, have shown that infections from small producers to assured producers were rare³². Although
263 consistent with our findings (Figure 4), our results also indicated that non-assured commercial producers
264 may constitute a bridge of infection between the non-commercial and commercial sectors of the swine
265 industry in Scotland. With regards to improving surveillance for incursions of emerging swine diseases in
266 Scotland, non-assured commercial producers may represent a sentinel population which would allow the
267 detection of incursions in the non-commercial sector of the industry.

268 In this study, we assessed the usefulness of national electronic animal movement databases as a tool for
269 traceability by examining the degree to which uncertainty around incursion time may affect predictions on
270 the pre-detection spread of emerging swine diseases such as CSF and ASF in Scotland. Our results on

271 movement patterns of swine in Scotland are also important for other exotic diseases of swine (e.g. foot-and-
272 mouth disease) and may have relevance for other swine industries. Although the pig industry in Scotland is
273 small, commercial production is well organised and focuses on assured production of high quality farrow-to-
274 finish pigs. The pig industry in Scotland also shows a relative high diversity of producer types, with a large
275 proportion of non-commercial pig holdings²⁰. The Scottish swine industry may then represent a good
276 example for similar industries, where non-commercial pig farming has an important place.

277 In Scotland, movements of swine shows a lack of seasonality²⁰, similar to what has been reported in other
278 countries^{12,33}. It may therefore be possible to extrapolate these results to other similarly structured pig
279 populations. In contrast, more work is required to determine whether these findings are applicable to other
280 livestock sectors. The magnitude and directionality of movements of cattle and sheep in Scotland are highly
281 seasonal. As such, these patterns will likely have an impact on the probability of epidemic take off^{5,11}, and
282 therefore are also likely to affect the predictability of the network structure in these sectors.

283 In conclusion, the type of premises and the uncertainty of the time of disease incursion will affect dynamic
284 network model accuracy and thus, usefulness. cursorily, it may appear that if the incursion time is uncertain,
285 using conservative estimates of incursion time (i.e. covering a wider time window) would increase the
286 probability of detecting all potentially infected farms. However, this approach also generates a larger number
287 of premises that would require field-based investigation (of which a higher proportion would be negative),
288 which would be challenging when resources are limited. Resources may be better placed trying to more
289 accurately determine the incursion time, since dynamic network models can make valuable predictions to
290 help with disease control and resource allocation if the incursion time is known. In such situation, efforts in
291 improving surveillance prior to disease incursion are critical to optimise responses to disease incursions.

292 **Methods**

293 **Data**

294 All movement data were extracted from the Scottish livestock electronic identification and traceability
295 database (ScotEID) which came into use in November 2011. We refer to ²⁰ for further details on the data
296 collection, process and quality as well as some preliminary descriptive analyses.

297 Briefly, under Scottish (SSI 2011/351) and European legislation (Commission Decision 2000/678/EC), all
298 pig keepers moving animals are required to register online with ScotEID and electronically record any
299 movements ahead of time. To avoid selection bias due to inevitable missing or non-reported movements in
300 the early stages of implementation of the database, we restricted our analysis to all movements recorded
301 from January 1st 2012 to May 31st 2013. We used January 1st 2012 for the start of the study period, on the
302 basis that (1) it corresponds to the time when the previous movement database (the Scottish Animal
303 Movement System, SAMS) recording Scottish animal movements ended (i.e. November 2011), and (2) there
304 has been a stabilisation of the movement pattern since December 2011.

305 The database provides a comprehensive picture of all movements of pigs in Scotland at the batch level. As
306 such, each movement record reports the County Parish Holding (CPH) identifier and postcode for departures
307 and destinations, the number of animals involved, and the date of the movements. Details of premises type
308 for departures and destinations are recorded in the movement database, allowing slaughterhouses, markets,
309 show-grounds and ferry collection centres to be differentiated from agricultural holdings. Note that all
310 markets recorded in ScotEID operate as auctioneers holding dedicated sales/collections of pigs for onward
311 consignment to a slaughterhouse, also named “red markets”. Collections of animals that are destined to be
312 slaughtered are therefore regularly carried out in these markets, but remain separated from the other
313 activities of such premises, particularly activities dedicated to sales of pigs between producers.

314 **Pig producer types**

315 Through the CPH identifier, the ScotEID movement database was linked to the 2011 Scottish Agricultural
316 Census, and to the 2010 GB Agricultural Census, to obtain information on the total number of pigs and sows
317 present on farm. We further link the data to the 2013 Quality Meat Scotland (QMS) register (for Scottish
318 premises) and to the 2013 Red Tractor register (for non-Scottish premises) to identify if producers were
319 members of a health quality assurance scheme. Pig producers were then classified according to their pig
320 population size, movement activity and the health quality assurance scheme membership²⁰:

- 321 1. “Small pig producers”: agricultural holdings with an unknown number of pigs; or less than five
322 sows, and/or less than 10 finishers; and showing no records of movements of more than 50 pigs
323 within the study period.
- 324 2. “Non-assured commercial producers”: agricultural holdings with more than five sows and/or more
325 than 10 finishers; or showing records of movements of more than 50 pigs during the study period,
326 but do not belong to a quality health assurance scheme from QMS or Red Tractor, the main British
327 assurance schemes.
- 328 3. “Assured commercial producers”: agricultural holdings with more than five sows and/or more than
329 10 finishers; or showing records of movements with more than 50 pigs during the study period but
330 also belong to a quality health assurance scheme from QMS and/or Red Tractor.

331 **Infection path**

332 The spread of disease within the Scottish swine industry was modelled using a simple stochastic discrete-
333 time SI model. Our model treated each premises involved in the movement of Scottish pigs as a single unit.
334 In this model, all premises are susceptible (S) to the infection at the start of the epidemics, except for a single
335 premises, chosen at random, that would initially be at the infected, and infectious, state (I). During the course
336 of an epidemic, disease passes from infected premises i to susceptible ones j via movements of pigs with a
337 probability $M_{ij,t}$ such as $M_{ij,t} = 1 - (1 - \beta)^{N_{ij,t}}$, where β is the probability that a single pig from i may carry
338 the disease and potentially transmit it to j (somewhat corresponding to the within-herd prevalence), $N_{ij,t}$ the
339 number of pigs that moved from i to j per time-step t and with movements of pigs synchronously updated at
340 each time-step. Although other transmission routes have also been implicated in the spread of swine fevers
341 (such as spread via fomites, wild boar, semen or pig products), only infection through live pig movements
342 was considered as it the most common transmission route^{17,18}. Here, the model is seeded at incursion time t_0 ,
343 progresses in discrete time steps t of one day, and runs for a fixed period T .

344 In addition to swine producers, gathering places (e.g. markets, show grounds, and ferry collection centres)
345 were considered in the spread of diseases. Regulations are in place in Scotland, as in most EU countries, to
346 ensure that the spread of pathogens via movements of animals through gathering places is limited. Gathering
347 places should not keep pigs overnight and have cleaning and disinfection implemented after each day of

348 activity (Council Directive 97/12/EC). As such, the model considers that all infected gathering places would
349 go back to the susceptible state after one day (thereby following a SIS process), whereas infected swine
350 producers would remain infected for the remaining of the simulation period T . As a consequence, epidemics
351 were considered starting by a swine producer only. The model was used only to look at the spread of disease
352 before detection. Therefore the control measures that would be initiated on identification of the disease (such
353 as culling of pigs on infected premises, movement restrictions) were not included in the model.

354 To ensure that only the heterogeneity and the structure of the dynamic network formed by the movements of
355 pigs were driving the modelled epidemics, all swine producers involved in the movements of pigs were
356 considered identical, such that their producer type or herd size would not have any effect on the transmission
357 dynamics. Unless otherwise stated, we considered the extreme case where infection occurs if at least one
358 animal from an infected premises is received by a susceptible one, i.e. when $\beta = 1$. It is obvious that, given
359 such a model structure, the characteristics of simulated epidemics would be overestimated and would not
360 reflect the intrinsic potential of disease spread in the Scottish swine industry. However, such a model
361 provides information on the maximum infection tree generated by each index-case via movements of
362 animals, which not only provides an estimate of the maximum epidemic size generated by the movement of
363 animals for the considered T , but also identifies all premises that are likely to be infected. Furthermore, such
364 a model structure provides an estimate of infection trees for each incursion location that is easily comparable
365 between time periods.

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469 **Authors' contributions**

470 TP designed the study, carried out the modelling and statistical analyses and drafted the manuscript. LAB
471 and HKA participated in the design of the study and contributed to final manuscript. CCG provided
472 information on the Scottish swine industry and contributed to final manuscript. GJG and MEJW contributed
473 to final manuscript. All authors gave final approval for publication.

474 **Additional Information**

475 The authors declare no competing financial interests.

476 **Figure legends**

477 Figure 1. Comparison between the correct infection path and predicted paths generated when the error δ in
478 the time of the incursion ranges from $-7\delta_0$ to $7\delta_0$. (a) Lines plot showing the smoothed size of the predicted
479 full epidemic tree $\Gamma_{t+\delta,i}$ as a function of the size of the correct full epidemic tree $\Gamma_{t,i}$. (b) Changes in the
480 Spearman correlation coefficient between the size of $\Gamma_{t,i}$ and that of $\Gamma_{t+\delta,i}$ as a function of the error δ in the
481 time of the incursion. Correlation coefficients are computed either upon all generated infection paths or upon
482 infection paths of >10 infected premises. (c) Changes in the Spearman correlation coefficient between the
483 size of $\Gamma_{t,i}$ and that of $\Gamma_{t+\delta,i}$ as a function of δ and stratified by the producer type of the index-case. (d) Quality
484 of infection path prediction, as measured by the median Jaccard similarity index, as a function of δ and
485 stratified by the producer type of the index-case. Shaded areas around each line shown in (a)-(d) represent
486 their respective confidence interval. Here, $\delta_0=7$ days. Diagonal solid line in (a) indicates perfect concordance
487 between the true and predicted length of infection paths. The vertical solid line in (b)-(d) indicates the time
488 of the correct incursion time.

489 Figure 2. Proportions of true (a) and false (b) positives between the correct full infection path and predicted
490 paths generated when the error δ in the time of the incursion ranges from $-7\delta_0$ to $7\delta_0$. Here, $\delta_0=7$ days.
491 Points/lines represent the observed median proportions, stratified as a function of the producer type of the
492 index-case, whereas shaded areas represent their respective 95% confidence interval. Only infection paths of
493 >10 infected premises are used. The vertical solid line indicates the time of the correct incursion time. The
494 proportion of true positives measures the fraction of common premises within paths $|\zeta_{t,i} \cup \zeta_{t+\delta,i}|$ among the
495 number of premises $|\zeta_{t,i}|$ that are on the correct path. The proportion of false positives measures the fraction
496 of uncommon premises within paths $1 - |\zeta_{t,i} \cup \zeta_{t+\delta,i}|$ among the number of premises $|\zeta_{t+\delta,i}|$ that are on the
497 wrong path.

498 Figure 3. Comparison between the correct infection path and paths generated when the error δ in the time of
499 the incursion ranges from $-7\delta_0$ to $7\delta_0$ and when imperfect transmission occurs. (a) Changes in the Spearman
500 correlation coefficient between the size of the correct infection path and paths generated when both the error
501 δ in the time of the incursion and the transmission probability β vary. Quality of infection path prediction, as

502 measured by the median Jaccard similarity index (b), proportion of true (c) positives and proportion of false
503 positives (d) between the correct infection path and paths generated when both δ and β vary. Solid and dotted
504 lines indicate how measures may change when comparing predicted partial infection path $\Gamma''_{t+\delta,i}$ to either the
505 correct partial epidemic tree $\Gamma'_{t,i}$ generated with $\delta=0$ and $\beta<1$ (solid) or the correct full epidemic tree $\Gamma_{t,i}$
506 generated with $\delta=0$ and $\beta=1$ (dotted). Shaded areas around each line shown in (b)-(d) represent the
507 confidence interval around the median. Here, $\delta_0=7$ days. The vertical solid line in (a)-(d) indicates the time of
508 the correct incursion time.

509 Figure 4. Proportion of non-assured commercial, assured commercial and small non-commercial producers
510 involved in infection paths of >10 infected premises generated by each producer type. Here, columns
511 indicate the producer type of the index-case, whereas rows indicate the type of the producers that are
512 involved in each infection path. The thickness of the shapes is proportional to the density of data points
513 along the x-axis.